The Ripple Effects of the Institutionalization of Private Car Ownership in North Korea

During a visit to Dandong, China, in January 2024, a Chinese businessman shared an unexpected piece of information. He said, "Recently, a large number of automobiles and automotive parts have been entering Pyongyang from China. The automobile sales market in Pyongyang is expected to expand significantly," adding, "In the near future, many vehicles bearing North Korea's own brands will appear." At that time, the significance of this statement was not yet apparent.

The inter-Korean joint venture Peace Automobile Complex built in Nampo in 2000 and the vehicles produced there. (Provided by the Peace Economy Institute)

One month later, news emerged that North Korea had amended Article 134 (Objects of Personal Ownership) of its Civil Law to permit individuals to register privately owned passenger vehicles in their own names. A Ministry of Unification official confirmed this development, stating, "In 2024, North Korea amended its laws relating to private car ownership, thereby concretizing the procedures by which individuals may possess personal vehicles." Reports also indicate that, unlike in the past, citizens are now permitted to purchase vehicles without having to prove the accumulation process of the funds used for the purchase, and that inheritance of such vehicles is also recognized.

Legally speaking, private car ownership in North Korea has long been permitted. Notably, the amended Constitution of 1998 included "income obtained through lawful economic activities" as an object of personal ownership, and expanded the scope of personal ownership to encompass equipment such as passenger vehicles. In practical terms, however, almost no North Korean resident was in a position to purchase a passenger vehicle through lawful income alone. Ownership was generally possible only through remittances from relatives living abroad in Japan, China, or elsewhere, or through state awards. Even in such cases, personal registration was not allowed; vehicles had to be registered with a state institution or business unit in order to be used. In effect, although nominally personal property, such vehicles were closer in form to "corporate vehicles."

A woman who lived in Sinuiju before defecting in 1999 recounted, "When I was living in North Korea, I brought a passenger vehicle in from China, registered it with the Ministry of Social Security (the police), and used it personally." She added, "The Sinuiju City Ministry of Social Security used it occasionally for urgent official work, but I mainly used it for transportation related to commerce." Another illustrative case occurred in August 1999, when Jong Song-ok won the women's marathon at the 7th IAAF World Championships in Athletics held in Spain, and the North Korean authorities awarded her a house and a passenger vehicle.

Entering the 2000s, as markets expanded and trade between North Korea and China became more active, the number of individuals using passenger vehicles informally began to increase. These were primarily individuals who had accumulated wealth through market activities and trade, as well as executives of joint venture and cooperative companies that had attracted foreign capital. In 2000, the Pyeonghwa Motors plant — a North-South joint venture — was completed in Nampo and began full-scale production of passenger vehicles. Repair shops also opened in several locations, thereby improving the overall environment for purchasing and operating passenger vehicles.

In 2017, passenger vehicles bearing "yellow license plates" — distinguishable from vehicles owned by state institutions or enterprises — finally appeared on the streets of Pyongyang. Even so, registration of vehicles in the name of individuals was still not permitted. It was only seven years later that the use of privately owned vehicles registered under personal names was institutionalized both legally and in practice.

Just as the spontaneous expansion of farmers' markets into general markets during the economic hardship of the 1990s eventually led, after several years of internal debate, to their institutionalization as "regional (district) markets," the institutionalization of private car ownership likewise appears to have been finalized only after considerable internal debate.

Some analysts characterize North Korea's institutionalization of private car ownership as "a strategy designed to incorporate the informal economy into an official 'registration' system and thereby strengthen state finance and control." According to this view, as the authorities could no longer ignore the wealth accumulated by citizens through economic activity and the corresponding demand for automobiles, they made the pragmatic choice to officially recognize such ownership while preserving state control.

If the authorities are practically unable to control the growing phenomenon of "indirect ownership," then through the personal registration process they can collect fees, absorb privately held foreign currency into state finances (since vehicle purchases are in effect made in foreign currency), and accumulate vehicle data — thereby achieving greater efficiency in traffic regulation and social control.

It is also likely that an additional objective behind the privatization of automobile ownership is to enable broader economic activity, stimulate domestic consumption, and thus revitalize the economy. Going further, some interpretations suggest that this measure is part of a larger blueprint aimed at partially adopting a Chinese-style market economy model.

View of the Amisan Auto Technical Service Center, established in the Hwaseong District of Pyongyang City (2025). (Provided by the Peace Economy Institute)

Following the legal institutionalization of private car ownership, the North Korean authorities have also begun to focus on enhancing consumer convenience related to the sale and repair of automobiles. A representative example is the Amisan Auto Technical Service Center, located in the Phase 3 new district of Pyongyang's Hwaseong District, which was completed in April of last year.

Choson Sinbo, the organ of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon), introduced the center as "a comprehensive automotive technical service base where all automobile-related services — including sales and repair — can be received," describing it as "a new type of facility that has not existed until now." According to the report, the center stocks a variety of vehicle parts and accessories, and also offers unmanned car washing, tire replacement, and paint services. The number of women receiving driver training in order to obtain driver's licenses is also reported to be increasing, as the Amisan Auto Technical Service Center provides vehicle rental services in addition to sales.

The Chollima Motor Trading Corporation, which holds entities such as the Chollima Motor Joint Venture Company and the Chollima Motor Integrated Plant under its umbrella, has also been expanding its scope of business from its initial focus on truck production at its founding in 1998 to passenger vehicles in recent years. The most recent issue (January 2026) of Kumsugangsan, a North Korean magazine targeting overseas Koreans, introduced the corporation as follows: "The Chollima Motor Trading Corporation is an enterprise that specializes in the research, assembly, sale, repair, and parts service of various types of rolling equipment." The article further stated that the corporation "has put in place an orderly comprehensive repair service system organized by vehicle type, ensuring maximum quality and speed of repairs, and has thus received favorable reviews from customers."

For what purposes are privately owned vehicles in Pyongyang being used? Cho Cheol-nam, a deputy at the Amisan Auto Technical Service Center, stated, "In recent times, the demand for private cars among Pyongyang citizens has been increasing." He further noted, "Citizens use private cars for commuting and business purposes, for visiting relatives, for receiving medical treatment, and for traveling with family members and colleagues." A separate report indicated that the number of private vehicles sold in Pyongyang last year reached approximately 8,000 units.

There are aspects of these reported usage patterns and sales figures that cannot be accepted entirely at face value. Nonetheless, photographs and video footage taken by foreign tourists who visited Pyongyang last year do confirm that the number of personally owned vehicles bearing yellow license plates has noticeably increased. One foreign visitor who traveled to Pyongyang in October of last year reported, "It was easy to spot passenger vehicles with yellow license plates, and I also confirmed the presence of vehicles bearing license plates in the 8,000 series."

Ten years ago, the SUV model "Ppeokkugi" (Cuckoo) produced by Pyeonghwa Motors was sold for approximately USD 30,000, while the "Junma" (Fine Steed), which was produced on the basis of South Korea's Chairman, was sold for around USD 40,000. These prices are of a wholly different order of magnitude from the USD 250–500 at which smartphones are being sold. The extent to which personal automobile purchases may become widespread in North Korea remains a subject of considerable interest.

Privately owned passenger vehicles, which have become a common sight in Pyongyang City in 2025. Passenger vehicles bearing yellow license plates are privately owned cars. (Provided by the Peace Economy Institute)

More noteworthy than the intentions of the North Korean authorities behind institutionalizing private car ownership, or the sales volume itself, are the broader ripple effects that this policy is likely to generate. First, there is the possibility of an expansion in personal and family-based tourism. The Constitution of North Korea explicitly stipulates the "freedom of residence and travel of citizens." Even during visits to North Korea in the 2000s, it was not uncommon at major tourist sites to encounter travelers — families or groups of friends — arriving in so-called "private cars" that had been registered to institutions or enterprises. The institutionalization of private car ownership is expected to substantially increase this form of private travel.

Of even greater interest is the possibility that the institutionalization of private car ownership may lead to the further institutionalization of personal housing ownership and sales. Through the 1998 constitutional revision, North Korea excluded buildings from the scope of collective ownership and permitted personal ownership of dwellings. The Civil Law also nominally recognizes personal ownership of housing. In practice, however, dwellings have been provided free of charge by the state and may be used only by residents who have been issued a "residence permit (ipsajeung)." Sales transactions are prohibited. Legally, only the "exchange of dwellings" is permitted.

Nevertheless, within the informal economic sphere, the practice of buying and selling (in the form of exchange) "housing usage rights" through unofficially prepared documentation has long been an open and widespread phenomenon. In particular, when state planning agencies, enterprises, and organizations engage in the construction of dwellings with the involvement of private capital, the dwellings allocated to the private capital share are in effect already being officially "individually distributed and sold."

A Chinese businessman who visited Pyongyang in October of last year offered the following analysis: "It is not impossible that [North] Korea will eventually announce nationwide regulations on the sale of commercial housing. This is comparable to the early period of China's reform and opening, when individuals held far greater sums of money than the state's finances."

Indeed, Chairman Kim Jong Il of the National Defense Commission stated in 2001: "In the future, once the problems of food and consumer goods are resolved, working people should be able to purchase food at proper market prices with their own income, and likewise to purchase dwellings or to use them upon payment of the full usage fee." In November 2018, the North Korean authorities further established the "Regulations on the Sale and Use of Dwellings in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone," which on a trial basis allowed "approved institutions, enterprises, and organizations" to construct and sell dwellings.

Viewed against this backdrop, it remains to be seen whether the institutionalization of private car ownership may ultimately extend to the institutionalization of housing sales practices as well.

---

Translator's Notes

• Civil Law Article 134 (Objects of Personal Ownership): Refers to the provision in the Civil Law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) that defines the categories of property eligible for individual (personal) ownership.

• Ministry of Social Security (사회안전부): The internal security and police authority of the DPRK. Names of this organ have changed over time (also referred to as the Ministry of People's Security in certain periods).

• Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, 재일조선인총연합회): A political organization of pro-Pyongyang Korean residents in Japan. Choson Sinbo (조선신보) is its official organ.

• Kumsugangsan (금수강산): A DPRK monthly magazine targeted at overseas Koreans. The title literally means "Land of Embroidered Rivers and Mountains."

• ipsajeung (입사증, residence permit / dwelling permit): An official certificate issued to residents that authorizes them to occupy a state-provided dwelling.

• Rason Economic and Trade Zone (라선경제무역지대): A special economic zone located in the northeastern coastal area of the DPRK (Rajin–Sonbong).

• Ppeokkugi (뻐꾸기) / Junma (준마): Model names of passenger vehicles previously produced by Pyeonghwa Motors. "Ppeokkugi" literally means "cuckoo"; "Junma" literally means "fine horse / steed."

Note on translation principles: This English version is a direct academic translation of the original Korean column. The original positions of images and captions have been preserved, with image captions translated in place. No interpretation, inference, or editorial commentary has been added by the translator. All factual statements correspond to those contained in the original source text.

---

Source: “Reading North Korea” column by Jung Chang-hyun (News1)

Jung Chang-hyun Director of the Peace Economy Institute  

He completed his graduate studies in Korean history at Seoul National University. He served as a senior reporter at the Institute of Contemporary History of JoongAng Ilbo. He also served as an adjunct professor at Kookmin University and University of North Korean Studies, and as an advisory committee member of the National Archives of Korea.

---

Key Summary and Structured Analysis

Structured key-point summary based exclusively on facts and analytical claims contained in the source column. No external inference has been introduced.

1.  Executive Summary

In 2024, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) amended Article 134 of its Civil Law (Objects of Personal Ownership) to formally permit individuals to register privately owned passenger vehicles in their own names. The Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea has confirmed this development. The amendment removed the previous requirement to prove the accumulation process of purchase funds and recognized inheritance of such vehicles.

Although the right of personal ownership over passenger vehicles was nominally established by the constitutional amendment of 1998, in practice individuals had to register vehicles under state institutions or enterprises, rendering them de facto "corporate vehicles." Yellow-plate private cars first appeared on Pyongyang streets in 2017, but full personal-name registration was only institutionalized seven years later in 2024.

The column identifies the institutionalization as a pragmatic state choice — to incorporate the informal economy into an official registration system, capture private foreign-currency holdings as state revenue, accumulate vehicle data for traffic and social control, and stimulate domestic consumption. The column further suggests that the policy may foreshadow a comparable institutionalization of personal housing sales.

2.  Key Facts from the Source Column

The following key facts are drawn directly from the source column without modification or external supplementation.

Category	Fact (per source column)
Legal Amendment	In 2024, the DPRK amended Civil Law Article 134 (Objects of Personal Ownership) to permit personal-name registration of passenger vehicles.
Confirming Authority	Confirmed by an official of the Ministry of Unification of the Republic of Korea.
Procedural Change	Purchase fund accumulation no longer needs to be proven; inheritance of vehicles is recognized.
Constitutional Basis (1998)	The 1998 amended Constitution included "income obtained through lawful economic activities" as an object of personal ownership and extended personal ownership to equipment such as passenger vehicles.
Early Case (1999)	A defector from Sinuiju reportedly imported a passenger vehicle from China and registered it with the Ministry of Social Security; marathon champion Jong Song-ok was awarded a house and a vehicle by the state.
Pyeonghwa Motors (2000)	The Pyeonghwa Motors plant, a North-South joint venture, was completed in Nampo and commenced full-scale production of passenger vehicles.
Yellow Plates (2017)	Passenger vehicles bearing yellow license plates, distinguishable from institutional vehicles, first appeared on Pyongyang streets. Personal-name registration was not yet permitted.
Amisan Service Center (2025)	Completed in April of last year in the Phase 3 new district of Pyongyang's Hwaseong District. Provides sales, repair, parts, accessories, unmanned car wash, tire replacement, paint, driver training, and rental services.
Chollima Motor Trading Corp.	Founded in 1998. Has expanded business scope from trucks to passenger vehicles. Holds the Chollima Motor Joint Venture Company and the Chollima Motor Integrated Plant under its umbrella.
Sales Volume (2025, Pyongyang)	Approximately 8,000 private vehicles sold in Pyongyang in the previous year (per reporting cited in the column).
Plate Number Range Observed	Yellow license plates up to the 8,000 series have been visually confirmed by a foreign visitor in October of the previous year.
Historical Prices (10 years ago)	Pyeonghwa Motors SUV "Ppeokkugi": ≈ USD 30,000; "Junma" (Chairman-based): ≈ USD 40,000; comparable smartphones: USD 250–500.
Cited Sources in Column	Choson Sinbo (Chongryon organ); Kumsugangsan magazine (January 2026 issue); a deputy of the Amisan center named Cho Cheol-nam; foreign tourists who visited Pyongyang in October of the previous year; a Chinese businessman who visited Pyongyang in October of the previous year.

3.  Historical Timeline of Private Car Policy

Year	Milestone
1998	Amended Constitution permits personal ownership of equipment including passenger vehicles; "income through lawful economic activities" recognized as object of personal ownership.
1999	Documented private-use case in Sinuiju (Ministry of Social Security registration); state award of vehicle to marathon champion Jong Song-ok.
2000	Pyeonghwa Motors plant (North-South joint venture) completed in Nampo; full-scale passenger vehicle production begins.
2001	Chairman Kim Jong Il directs that, once food and consumer-goods problems are resolved, workers should be able to purchase dwellings with their own income or pay the full usage fee.
2017	Yellow-plate vehicles distinguishable from institutional vehicles first appear in Pyongyang. Personal-name registration still not permitted.
2018	November: "Regulations on the Sale and Use of Dwellings in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone" established on a pilot basis.
2024	Civil Law Article 134 amended. Personal-name registration of private vehicles institutionalized. Inheritance recognized; fund-source proof requirement removed.
2025	Amisan Auto Technical Service Center completed (April) in Hwaseong District Phase 3 of Pyongyang. Approximately 8,000 private vehicles reportedly sold in Pyongyang during the year.
2026	Kumsugangsan magazine (January issue) describes Chollima Motor Trading Corporation's expanded comprehensive automotive repair service system.

4.  Policy Intent Analysis (as presented in the Column)

The column presents four interpretive frames regarding the state's intent. These are analytical claims rather than confirmed state declarations and are reproduced here as presented in the source.

#	Interpretive Frame	Mechanism Described in the Column
1	Formalization Strategy	Incorporate the informal economy into an official "registration" system to strengthen state finance and control over wealth that can no longer be ignored.
2	Fee Collection & Foreign Currency Absorption	Through personal registration, the state collects fees and absorbs privately held foreign currency (vehicle purchases are effectively in foreign currency) into state finances.
3	Data-Driven Social Control	Accumulation of vehicle ownership data increases the efficiency of traffic regulation and broader social control.
4	Domestic Consumption Stimulus	Privatization of vehicle ownership enables broader economic activity, stimulating domestic consumption — potentially as part of a larger framework that selectively adopts elements of a Chinese-style market economy.

5.  Anticipated Ripple Effects (per the Column)

The column identifies two principal ripple effects that warrant attention going forward.

5.1  Expansion of Personal and Family-Based Tourism

The Constitution of the DPRK stipulates the "freedom of residence and travel of citizens." Already in the 2000s, travelers using institutionally registered vehicles for family or friend group trips were observed at major tourist sites. The institutionalization of private car ownership is therefore expected to substantially expand such private-purpose travel.

5.2  Potential Institutionalization of Personal Housing Sales

This is identified by the column as the more significant ripple effect. The relevant background contained in the source includes:

•       The 1998 constitutional amendment removed buildings from the scope of collective ownership and permitted personal ownership of dwellings; the Civil Law also nominally recognizes personal ownership of housing.

•       In practice, dwellings have been provided free of charge by the state; use is permitted only for holders of a "residence permit (ipsajeung)." Sales are prohibited and only "exchange of dwellings" is legally permitted.

•       The informal exchange of "housing usage rights" through unofficial documentation is described as an open and widespread practice.

•       When state planning agencies, enterprises, and organizations construct dwellings with private capital, the private-capital share is in effect already being individually distributed and sold.

•       Chairman Kim Jong Il directed in 2001 that working people should eventually be able to purchase dwellings or pay the full usage fee from their own income.

•       In November 2018, the "Regulations on the Sale and Use of Dwellings in the Rason Economic and Trade Zone" were established, allowing approved institutions, enterprises, and organizations to construct and sell dwellings on a pilot basis.

•       A Chinese businessman who visited Pyongyang in October of the previous year is quoted as stating that nationwide regulations on commercial housing sales are "not impossible," comparing the conditions to those of China's early reform-and-opening period.

6.  Market Indicators and Quantitative Reference Points

Indicator	Value / Description
Pyongyang Private-Vehicle Sales (2025)	Approximately 8,000 units (per reporting cited in the column).
Visually Confirmed Plate Range	Yellow license plates in the 8,000 series (October of previous year).
Vehicle Price — "Ppeokkugi" SUV	≈ USD 30,000 (Pyeonghwa Motors, 10 years prior to the column).
Vehicle Price — "Junma"	≈ USD 40,000 (based on South Korea's Chairman, 10 years prior).
Comparable Smartphone Price	USD 250–500.
Order-of-Magnitude Differential	Vehicle prices are approximately 60–160 times higher than smartphone prices (derived directly from the column's price references).

The column itself notes that the cited usage patterns and sales volumes cannot be accepted entirely at face value; corroboration consists primarily of photographs and video footage from foreign tourists.

7.  Fact-versus-Opinion Demarcation

Per the editorial standards governing this translation, the following demarcation distinguishes factual reporting from analytical claims and quoted opinions within the source column.

Category	Elements in the Source Column
FACT (verifiable)	2024 amendment of Civil Law Article 134; Ministry of Unification confirmation; 1998 constitutional content; 2000 completion of Pyeonghwa Motors; 2017 appearance of yellow plates; 2018 Rason Zone housing regulation; 2025 completion of Amisan Service Center; Cho Cheol-nam quotation; Choson Sinbo and Kumsugangsan citations.
REPORTED CLAIM	8,000 vehicles sold in Pyongyang (reported); usage patterns described by the Amisan center deputy; price points of "Ppeokkugi" and "Junma" 10 years prior; foreign tourists' observations.
ANALYTICAL OPINION	Interpretation that the policy is a strategy to formalize the informal economy; the four interpretive frames for policy intent; the analogy to China's reform-and-opening period (attributed to a Chinese businessman); the projection that institutionalization may extend to housing sales.

8.  Key Takeaways

#	Takeaway (faithful to the source column)
1	The 2024 Civil Law amendment marks the first instance in which personal-name registration of private vehicles is institutionalized in the DPRK, closing a 26-year gap between nominal constitutional permission (1998) and practical realization.
2	The institutionalization process parallels the earlier transition of farmers' markets into regional (district) markets — both followed prolonged internal debate before formal recognition of de facto practice.
3	Removal of the fund-source proof requirement and recognition of inheritance constitute the substantive procedural shifts that distinguish the 2024 amendment from the prior regime.
4	Supporting infrastructure — the Amisan Auto Technical Service Center and the expanded Chollima Motor Trading Corporation — indicates that the legal change is accompanied by deliberate consumer-facing service expansion.
5	The combination of fee collection, foreign-currency absorption, vehicle data accumulation, and domestic consumption stimulus is presented as a coherent state objective rather than a single-purpose reform.
6	The column identifies housing sales as the next plausible field of institutionalization, citing the 2001 Kim Jong Il directive and the 2018 Rason Zone regulation as preparatory precedents.
7	The price gap between automobiles (USD 30,000–40,000) and smartphones (USD 250–500) raises an open question — explicitly posed by the column — regarding the realistic ceiling of private-car popularization in the DPRK.

9.  Editorial and Translation Notes

•       This translation and analysis are faithful to the source column. No external sources have been introduced. No interpretive content has been added beyond what is contained in the original text.

•       Image positions and captions from the original column have been preserved in Part I. Actual image files were not provided with the source text; image placeholders display the original captions translated into English.

•       Proper names follow widely recognized romanization (Pyongyang, Pyeonghwa Motors, Chollima, Rason, Jong Song-ok, Kim Jong Il).

•       Quoted speech is rendered in English using closely faithful equivalents; original quotation marks have been preserved.

•       Where the source uses temporal references such as "last year" or "10 years ago," these have been retained as written in the source rather than converted to absolute dates, to preserve fidelity to the original column.

•       "NK Insights" appears as the English equivalent of the column's umbrella section name, in accordance with the platform's established English nomenclature.