North Korea's 2nd Plenary Meeting: Key Insights and Implications

Overview of the Meeting

From June 20 to 22, North Korea held an enlarged session of the 2nd Plenary Meeting of the 9th Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party. This meeting focused on a mid-year review of Party and state policy implementation for the first half of the year. It also discussed work plans for the second half and addressed several important issues. The Party plenary meeting serves as a platform for discussing and deciding major internal and external Party matters between Party Congresses.

Agenda Highlights

The agenda for this plenary meeting included four main items:

1. Evaluation of first-half work progress.

2. Adoption of a resolution "On Promoting the Coal Industry and Transforming Coal-Mining Villages Nationwide."

3. Adoption of a resolution "On a Series of Measures to Enhance the Role of City and County People's Committees."

4. Organizational matters.

   
   

In the first agenda item, General Secretary Kim Jong Un outlined the direction of Party and state policy. He also presented short-term and medium- to long-term tasks for the future. North Korean state media focused on the parts of this Important Conclusion that related to strengthening national defense capability.

Reaffirming Nuclear Force as the Core of Self-Defense

Kim emphasized a policy of strengthening self-defensive deterrence centered on nuclear force. He stated, "Strength is itself national sovereignty and national prestige." The country will "pursue, even more aggressively, the work of further expanding and strengthening our self-defensive deterrent." He highlighted the need to expand nuclear force and naval power while calling for the growth of the munitions industry base.

Kim cited increasing "nuclear threats" from South Korea and the United States as justification for this policy. He specifically targeted the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a ROK-U.S. extended deterrence consultation body. The ROK and the U.S. held the 6th NCG meeting in Seoul on June 11, issuing a joint statement affirming "a shared commitment to North Korea's denuclearization." Kim characterized the NCG as a "nuclear war apparatus aimed at attacking the Republic," asserting that the six rounds of simulation exercises conducted thus far have produced detailed nuclear war scenarios.

"Continuously expanding and strengthening our nuclear force — which lies at the core of the Republic's military sovereignty and forms the backbone of our strategy for deterring and waging war — and thoroughly exercising our status as a nuclear weapons state, is the most accurate and only path by which we can proactively and confidently respond to the complex and unpredictable shifts in the international military and political landscape."

Kim reaffirmed the Party's principle of confrontational struggle against South Korea. He stated that "the Party's principle of confrontational struggle, having officially designated South Korea as the most hostile state, must be thoroughly upheld." He directed that the ongoing fortification work along the southern border be "qualitatively completed." This confirmed that gestures such as the visit of the Naegohyang football club to the South or humanitarian assistance related to Jeju Island bear no relation to this principle.

Expanding the Local Development Agenda

The adoption of resolutions on the remaining two agenda items reflects measures to expand and reinforce North Korea's local development policy. The plenary decided that, starting next year, construction will commence to modernize housing in coal-mining villages nationwide. In his policy address at the 1st Session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly on March 23, General Secretary Kim directed that national resources be mobilized to carry out large-scale construction of approximately 20,000 housing units annually for four years. This aims to completely transform the coal-mining districts.

Since 2024, North Korea has pursued its "Local Development 20×10 Policy." This initiative aims to build modern local factories in 20 counties within ten years. Initially focused on local factories, the scope has expanded to include rural housing, medical and educational facilities, grain storage facilities, and general service centers. The modernization of coal-mining villages has now been added. Contrary to outside assessments suggesting that North Korea's local development policy may hit a wall due to the enormous financial and material resources required, North Korea is continuing to expand the program. The regime promotes the narrative that local development work is "not merely an economic undertaking but a political undertaking that cultivates the youth of the regions." It emphasizes the need to close the gap between urban and rural areas.

A Response to Washington and Seoul's 'Dialogue Gestures'

The policy direction confirmed at this plenary meeting continues the content set out at the 9th Party Congress held in February and in General Secretary Kim's policy address to the Supreme People's Assembly in March. The emphasis on expanding nuclear force and the principle of confrontational struggle against South Korea can be interpreted as North Korea's response to recent 'dialogue gestures' from the South Korean and U.S. leaderships.

On June 13, President Trump posted a photograph of himself with General Secretary Kim during their June 12, 2018 summit in Singapore. This prompted interpretations that President Trump was signaling that 'North Korea is next' on his negotiation agenda. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young suggested that "a personal letter from Kim Jong Un may have quietly arrived around the time of President Trump's birthday," implying that President Trump may have posted the photo in response to receiving such a letter.

President Lee Jae-myung disclosed that he had discussed the North Korean nuclear issue with President Trump at the recent G7 summit. In a press briefing on June 19, President Lee said that President Trump had remarked that "it is time to pay attention to the North Korea issue," expressing interest in U.S.-North Korea dialogue. President Lee's decision to disclose this exchange is interpreted as an indirect signal that both the South Korean and U.S. leaders are willing to negotiate with North Korea.

It seems plausible that the United States and Japan have conveyed their willingness for dialogue to North Korea through indirect channels. Yet General Secretary Kim, without offering any direct response, escalated his criticism of South Korea and the United States during this plenary meeting. He made it clear that North Korea has no interest in 'dialogue without preconditions' while facing pressure for denuclearization and the absence of any rollback of hostile policy.

At the China-North Korea summit held in Pyongyang on June 8, North Korea criticized U.S. extended deterrence and expressed wariness over strengthening ROK-Japan and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. This openly signaled its intent to confront any counterpart that refuses to recognize its status as a nuclear weapons state. At the 9th Party Congress, Kim stated that there would be no reason for North Korea not to engage in dialogue at any time, provided the United States withdrew its hostile policy and recognized North Korea's standing as a nuclear weapons state. However, he set out preconditions for dialogue that neither the United States nor South Korea can readily accept.

A 'Phased Solution' Facing Difficult Odds

President Lee reportedly raised with President Trump the idea of a 'phased solution' to the North Korean nuclear issue. He suggested that "the United States is the only party capable of engaging North Korea in dialogue" and expressed hope that "President Trump would put forward a realistic proposal that North Korea could find acceptable." This reflects the government's approach of using a 'halt' to North Korea's nuclear activities as a starting point for U.S.-North Korea dialogue, with the ultimate goal of achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, through this plenary meeting, North Korea reaffirmed not a halt to nuclear activities but rather the expansion and strengthening of its nuclear force. Prior to this, North Korea publicly unveiled a newly operational nuclear material production facility.

With North Korea reaffirming its line of nuclear force buildup, and with China shifting its policy to avoid publicly raising the North Korean nuclear issue, the government's 'phased solution' is unlikely to yield results in the short term. Furthermore, in a context where North Korea has designated South Korea as a hostile state, building national consensus around either a constitutional amendment accommodating North Korea's two-state theory or discussions on inter-Korean cooperation projects will not be easy.

The Need for Institutionalizing Peaceful Coexistence

In this context, rather than fixating on a 'breakthrough in inter-Korean dialogue,' the government should focus on coordinating differences among ministries. It should secure public consensus toward the 'institutionalization of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula' — the immediate goal set out under its 'Korean Peninsula Peaceful Coexistence Policy.'

The Ministry of National Defense's stated intention to retain language in this year's forthcoming Defense White Paper designating the North Korean regime and military as the enemy; the Ministry of Unification's position that peaceful coexistence cannot be pursued while North Korea remains designated as the principal enemy; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' stance that ROK-U.S. and U.S.-Japan extended deterrence cooperation is a legitimate response to North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile programs — these divergent positions raise doubts as to whether the government is maintaining unity and consistency regarding its 'Korean Peninsula Peaceful Coexistence Policy.'

Only by securing domestic societal consensus around the 'Korean Peninsula Peaceful Coexistence Policy' and institutionalizing it can the policy's long-term stability be maintained and space for inter-Korean cooperation be created.

About the Author

Jung Chang-hyun | Director, Peace Economy Research Institute

Historian and journalist. Graduated from the Department of Korean History, Seoul National University; completed doctoral coursework at the same institution. Currently Director of the Peace Economy Research Institute. Has pursued research, writing, and journalistic activities in the fields of inter-Korean relations and modern North Korean history for nearly 30 years.