North Korea Confronting the Climate Crisis: Shifting Strategies and Pathways for Inter-Korean Cooperation
Updated: Jun 4
SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION | NK Insights Column
North Korea's policies and approaches to addressing climate change and natural disasters have undergone significant transformation in recent years. Understanding what has changed and how it has changed is a prerequisite for developing inter-Korean cooperation frameworks. North Korea has elevated climate crisis response and disaster prevention to a national priority, enacting a 'Crisis Response Law,' shifting agricultural crops, expanding afforestation, and scaling up renewable energy. The author argues that, until international sanctions are eased or lifted, a 'Northeast Asia International Conference' on climate change should be convened at the NGO and academic level—mediated through the international community and overseas Korean communities—to evaluate and propose alternatives to North Korea's climate response measures, facilitate knowledge exchange in science and technology, and strengthen expert capacity. Through this process, a phased approach must be developed to help North Korea itself recognize the necessity of inter-Korean cooperation and to initiate direct inter-Korean engagement. |
Jung Chang-hyun | Director, Peace Economy Research Institute Jung Chang-hyun is a historian and journalist who graduated from the Department of Korean History at Seoul National University and completed doctoral coursework at the same institution. He currently serves as Director of the Peace Economy Research Institute and has pursued research, writing, and journalistic activities in the fields of inter-Korean relations and modern North Korean history for nearly 30 years. After joining the Joong-Ang Ilbo's Institute of Modern History as a reporter, he conducted in-depth reporting on North Korea and the history of national division over many years, and subsequently lectured at Kookmin University and the University of North Korean Studies. He has served as an advisory committee member for the Ministry of Unification and the National Archives of Korea, and has held positions as policy committee member of the National Reconciliation Council, policy planning committee member of the Jogye Order's National Community Development Headquarters, and other roles. Since the 2020s, he has delivered lectures at various policy academies—including the 'Korean Peninsula Strategy Academy'—on topics including North Korea's economic strategy, changes in inter-Korean relations, and the direction of unification policy. His publications include: Figures in Modern North Korean History; Reading North Korean Society in Depth; North Korea That Changes and North Korea That Does Not; Society and Life in the North; Reading the Kim Jong Un Era in Keywords; People of the Ahn Jung-geun Family; and Viewing the Division Through a Lens of Peace, among others. |
A Changed Approach to Disaster Response
In late July 2024, record-breaking heavy rains caused the Amnok (Yalu) River to overflow, inflicting severe damage on Sinuiju City and Uiju County in North Pyongan Province, as well as northern areas of Jagang and Ryanggang Provinces. It was a disaster born of abnormal climate conditions—yet it was also a man-made calamity, the result of a failure to institute fundamental countermeasures against the recurring floods of the Amnok River.
Particularly noteworthy was the government's response. When the Amnok River flooded, Chairman Kim Jong Un personally visited the disaster sites in Sinuiju City and Uiju County, directly commanding rescue and evacuation operations—including the deployment of military helicopters. All 13,000-plus flood victims were subsequently relocated to Pyongyang, after which soldiers and youth shock-brigade members were mobilized for reconstruction. New residential housing was completed within four months.
[December 2024] Recovered village of Hadanri, Sinuiju City, four months after reconstruction. |
Overhauling the Disaster Response System at Central and Local Levels; Focus on Improving Residents' Response Capacity
On December 21, 2024, Chairman Kim Jong Un personally attended the completion ceremony for residential housing in the flood-affected areas of North Pyongan Province, where he outlined the future policy direction on disaster response.
The Chairman candidly acknowledged that while the flooding was a consequence of climate change, the state's disaster prevention institutional framework had been lax, compounded by the irresponsibility and complacency of officials. He emphasized that cadres needed to undertake self-reflection and gain hands-on experience through the reconstruction process, stressing that "such experience is indispensable for handling future crises." This signaled his determination to resolve entrenched problems of passive complacency and systemic deficiencies in the disaster response framework by carrying out the flood reconstruction entirely through internal means.
Eojeokdo Village, Uiju County, before the 2024 flood (above) and during reconstruction (below) |
The Chairman also disclosed that in the early stages of flood recovery, the government had declined offers of assistance from several countries and international organizations. He explained the rationale for adhering to a "method of resolving problems through absolute self-reliance," arguing that what mattered most was self-confidence in one's own strength and the "spiritual and material assets of self-reliance that would grow stronger through the arduous construction." He stated that "it was the Party's intention to trust in the strength of the military, youth, and people, and through the united force of the entire nation, complete the disaster recovery within the set deadline—thereby further cultivating the Juche-based capacity to break through any national crisis through self-reliance."
Chairman Kim had demonstrated similar behavior in 2020, when Hwanghae and South Hamgyong Provinces suffered severe typhoon damage. On that occasion as well, he personally inspected the affected areas, directed the central government to supply reserve grain (stockpiled rice), and ordered the implementation of fundamental countermeasures. In August 2023, typhoons and torrential rains collapsed the embankment of the Ansok tidal flat reclamation project in South Pyongan Province, and in 2024 the Amnok River flooded again. North Korea thus used the Amnok River flood disaster as an opportunity to mobilize national capacity to once again test its disaster response system and accumulate experience in enhancing human, material, and technical response capabilities. Through this process, the disaster response systems at both central and local levels appear to have been firmly reorganized, with residents' response capabilities also significantly improved.
A Qualitative Transformation in Climate Change and Crisis Response Capacity Following the 8th Party Congress
International organizations assess North Korea's level of adaptation to climate change as very low. Although North Korea has expressed concern about climate change, a willingness to respond, and an intention to join international collective efforts, various factors are cited as impediments: the absence of a governance framework for effective policy implementation; insufficient understanding of and technical capacity related to climate change impacts; and the difficulty of receiving international support due to economic sanctions against North Korea. These factors have not been fully resolved and continue to require sustained attention. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that since the 8th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party in January 2021, North Korea's climate change and crisis response framework has achieved a qualitative leap.
Through the 8th Party Congress, North Korea espoused the principles of 'People-First Principle' (인민대중제일주의) and 'Self-Reliance First' (자강력제일주의), and these orientations have also influenced the direction of responses to the climate crisis and natural disasters. First, North Korea resolved to advance national land management and national environmental protection as key policies and agenda items to protect the lives, property, and territory of its people from climate change-induced natural disasters, incorporating these into the Five-Year National Economic Development Plan (2021–2025). At the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee (September 2, 2021), Chairman Kim Jong Un instructed that the promotion of national land management be treated as a top priority alongside the formulation of climate crisis countermeasures. Subsequently, in September 2022, Kim Jong Un personally presided over the State Disaster Prevention Work Review Conference for the first time and directed measures to strengthen disaster prevention and crisis response capabilities. Immediately following the conference, a new 'Crisis Response Law' was also enacted.
The series of measures adopted at and after the 8th Party Congress signals a significant elevation of North Korea's policy priority for climate crisis response and disaster prevention—in response to public health crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic and continuing natural disasters. This is assessed as part of an effort to compensate for 'insufficient response capacity,' which has long been regarded as the most critical factor behind North Korea's heightened disaster risk. Indeed, since the 8th Party Congress, North Korea has moved beyond merely formulating adaptive strategies and countermeasures to reduce the adverse effects of climate change: it has articulated specific policy targets for climate crisis and disaster preparedness and incorporated them into the budget; it has increased institutional accountability through legal codification; and it has emphasized 'implementation' over 'rhetoric,' carefully monitoring progress toward phased targets, holding officials accountable for deficiencies, administering personnel measures, and providing incentives to high-performing units—thereby producing considerable real-world results.
Enactment of the 'Crisis Response Law': Government-Level Response to Climate Crisis and Disasters
First, the government has systematized its guidelines (manuals) for climate crisis and disaster response, raising the level of national disaster preparedness and public education. To this end, the 'State Emergency Disaster Committee'—now elevated in political standing—has formulated regional disaster risk reduction plans and prepared and distributed unit-level codes of conduct constituting disaster response plans, as well as public action guidelines for different types of disasters such as typhoons, earthquakes, and wildfires.
The state has also continuously reported through the media on abnormal weather conditions and disaster situations around the world to heighten public vigilance; and it has disseminated applications such as the 'Mobile Phone Weather Information Service System' (Weather 2.0) via smartphones. Through these measures, new operational guidelines have been established for the organization and operation of 'Emergency Disaster Crisis Response Command Teams' within each central ministry, local authority, institution, enterprise, and organization. Standards have been set covering disaster prevention, response, and recovery activities—including alert and evacuation systems, emergency mobilization protocols, order of priorities, and mandatory principles. In 2022, this content was codified into law through the enactment of the 'Crisis Response Law.'
Agricultural Policy Shift: Two Consecutive Years of Exceeding Food Production Targets Despite Ongoing Natural Disasters
Second, in response to the climate crisis, North Korea has replaced corn (maize) with wheat as its primary cultivated crop, and is constructing large-scale greenhouse farms in each province to ensure a stable supply of vegetables. In the Voluntary National Review (VNR) submitted to the United Nations in 2021, North Korea set as its agricultural sector goals: the establishment of a stable food production system by 2030; the preservation of the environment and improvement of land; and the cultivation of agricultural production capacity adaptable to natural disasters. Within this policy framework, the 8th Party Congress of the Korean Workers' Party enacted a policy shift from rice-and-corn-centered cultivation to rice-and-wheat-centered cultivation. The Farm Law revised in 2021 also stipulated that "in the arrangement of crops, corn farming shall be restricted to the maximum, and a directional shift shall be made toward rice farming and wheat and barley farming."
While partly reflecting changes in the dietary culture of the younger generation, this represents a preemptive response based on projections that climate change will significantly reduce corn yields while increasing wheat output. In practice, despite ongoing natural disasters, North Korea has achieved food production targets for two consecutive years. Greenhouse facilities have been completed on military installation sites, including the Jeungpyeong Greenhouse Farm in North Hamgyong Province (2019), the Yonpo Greenhouse Farm in South Hamgyong Province (2022), and the Gangdong Greenhouse Farm in Pyongyang (2024). Construction of large-scale greenhouse farms capable of year-round harvesting is currently underway in each province.
[2024] Namyang Workers' District, Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province, as seen from the Ilgwangsan Observatory in Tumen City, China. The formerly barren, reddish mountains have turned green as a result of afforestation programs. Photo courtesy of the author. |
'General Plan for Forest Construction (2015–2044)': Targets for Forest Creation Being Met
Third, North Korea has actively pursued forest restoration to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and prevent natural disasters, achieving the first-decade targets of Phase 1 of the 'General Plan for Forest Construction (2015–2044).'
North Korea set a target of creating approximately 1.682 million hectares of forest by 2024 and reducing greenhouse gas emissions by more than approximately 10 million tonnes annually. Although a final evaluation has not yet been released, it is estimated that the target has been reached. North Korea announced that in 2025 alone, more than 100 million trees have already been planted. Indeed, the once barren mountains of North Korean territory as seen from China are becoming greener with each passing year. Tree species are also being diversified and differentiated—from fast-growing species to "timber forests, economic forests, protective forests, scenic forests, and fuelwood forests," among others. However, in mountainous areas where demand for heating fuel and firewood remains high, the margin of improvement is still low, leaving this as a challenge for the future.
'30-Year Renewable Energy Utilization Plan (2014–2044)': Expanding the Share of Renewable Energy Generation
Fourth, North Korea is expanding the utilization of eco-friendly renewable energy. To this end, North Korea has designated the resolution of the electricity shortage as its highest-priority policy task, and has formulated a '30-Year Renewable Energy Utilization Plan (2014–2044)' to expand the proportion of renewable energy generation, including solar, wind, tidal, and nuclear power. In this process, four elements—green building technology, zero-energy building technology, zero-carbon building technology, and sustainable construction—were applied on a pilot basis in the construction of Pyongyang's Ryomyong Street (completed in 2017) and the Jangcheon Vegetable Specialized Cooperative Farm. These principles are now being applied to newly constructed local housing and factory construction.
Conceptual diagrams of green buildings and 'zero-energy buildings' introduced in『Pyongyang Design (2015, Issue No. 4), the journal of the Pyongyang City Committee of the Korean Architects Union. |
Advancing Balanced National Development to Enhance Climate Crisis Response Capacity
Beyond the above, North Korea is pursuing the modernization and regular maintenance of wastewater treatment facilities, the establishment of a 100%-collection-and-treatment system for domestic and industrial wastewater, and the construction of a nationwide water quality monitoring system—all in the interest of ecological environmental protection, including water resource management and marine resource conservation. North Korea is also moving toward the efficient use and recycling of national resources, expansion of waste treatment plants, encouragement of tourism and eco-friendly architecture for green growth, and the expansion of biosphere reserves.
In particular, North Korea is simultaneously pursuing these policies in conjunction with the newly adopted policy line of strengthening cities and counties at the local level (시·군강화노선), connecting them with the construction of local housing and factories, as well as the new construction and modernization of education and healthcare facilities. North Korea's pursuit of balanced national development is expected to raise its overall climate crisis response capacity.
North Korea's vision for local industrial and rural development under the county-strengthening policy line. |
Inter-Korean Cooperation for Climate Crisis Response Is Essential, Not Optional—Yet Realistically Difficult
The majority of domestic and international experts recognize that the cumulative damage from North Korea's natural disasters is the result of a combination of factors—including the fragility of the North Korean system, economic difficulties, and insufficient technical response capacity—and they have called for inter-Korean cooperation. Cooperation in ecosystem preservation and forestry are most frequently cited as representative areas.
Having declared an 'antagonistic two-state relationship' at the end of 2023, North Korea is expected to maintain its 'policy of ignoring the South' rather than engage in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, focusing instead on transitioning from an 'antagonistic relationship' to a 'peaceful relationship.' Moreover, a series of circumstances severely constrains the possibility and scope of inter-Korean cooperation: North Korea's refusal of humanitarian assistance; the impossibility of inter-Korean development cooperation unless sanctions are lifted; and the political and security imperatives that require the linking of North Korea policy to denuclearization.
Normatively speaking, inter-Korean cooperation for climate crisis response is essential, not optional. Yet realistically, even basic capacity-building activities that are routinely conducted in other developing countries to strengthen climate change response capabilities cannot be carried out in North Korea due to sanctions.
Shifting from Direct Inter-Korean Exchange and Consultation to International and Multilateral Cooperation
North Korea is expanding exchanges with traditional friendly states such as Russia, China, and Vietnam, as well as with neutral countries; it is seeking support from international organizations; and it is showing interest in contact and exchange with overseas Korean communities. While concentrated investment at the central government level is yielding results in pilot projects, scaling these up nationwide will require international support and investment attraction.
In the past, when South Korea advocated exchange within an international framework, it was North Korea that emphasized direct inter-Korean exchange and consultation. The situation has now been reversed: North Korea is the party emphasizing an international and multilateral cooperative framework. Consequently, inter-Korean cooperation in the various areas needed to address the global climate crisis will have no choice but to be pursued through the international community and overseas Korean communities as intermediaries—until international sanctions are eased or lifted.
As a first step, a 'Northeast Asia International Conference' should be convened at the NGO and academic level to discuss the climate crisis and explore cooperative measures. Through this conference, substantive contributions should be made to the evaluation of and proposals for North Korea's climate crisis countermeasures, to knowledge exchange in science and technology, and to the strengthening of expert capacity. Through this process, a phased approach must be developed that will lead North Korea itself to recognize the necessity of inter-Korean cooperation and to initiate direct inter-Korean engagement.
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