What the Collapse of a U.S.–DPRK Summit Meeting Tells Us

 June 30, 2019 — U.S. President Donald Trump and Korean Workers' Party General Secretary Kim Jong Un meet and shake hands at Panmunjom.

"There are no eternal allies, and no perpetual enemies. Only our interests are eternal."

— Attributed to Lord Palmerston, 19th-century British Prime Minister

This is an adage attributed to the 19th-century British Prime Minister Palmerston, and one widely invoked in international diplomacy. It also aptly describes the shifting alignments and realignments now emerging in the reordering of the international system.

North Korean diplomacy is no exception. In 2009, North Korea declared that "without a fundamental liquidation of the United States' hostile policy toward Korea and its nuclear threat, we will not be the first to lay down our nuclear weapons, not in a hundred years" — and pronounced the Six-Party Talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear issue "finished forever." Yet when the author asked a senior North Korean official around that same period, "So are you really not coming back to the Six-Party Talks?", he replied: "Is there anything eternal in international politics? If our sovereignty is respected and the framework of dialogue changes, we will return to the negotiating table."

Nine years later, in 2018, North Korea came to the April inter-Korean summit and the June U.S.–DPRK summit, agreeing to "complete denuclearization" premised upon the normalization of U.S.–DPRK relations. Although the Hanoi U.S.–DPRK summit of February 2019 collapsed without result, General Secretary Kim Jong Un responded four months later to U.S. President Donald Trump's surprise proposal for a meeting and appeared at the Panmunjom summit encounter.

◆ A Cold Reception, Six Years Later

President Trump, who visited South Korea on the occasion of the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Gyeongju, again proposed a "surprise meeting" to General Secretary Kim. North Korea's response, however, was chilly — unlike six years earlier.

Around the time of his arrival in Gyeongju on October 29, President Trump described North Korea as "a kind of nuclear power" and even floated the card of sanctions relief, demonstrating an active posture toward a U.S.–DPRK summit meeting. North Korea, however, issued no official position whatsoever. When President Trump went so far as to say he "could extend his stay in South Korea," expectations arose that perhaps something had come of behind-the-scenes contacts between Washington and Pyongyang — but in the end this proved to be wishful thinking.

Although North Korea issued no official position, it dispatched Foreign Minister Ch'oe Sŏn-hui, its senior working-level diplomatic official, to Russia and Belarus on October 26 — before President Trump's arrival in South Korea — effectively signaling a "tacit refusal." In retrospect, and contrary to the Ministry of Unification's hopeful projections, a Trump–Kim Panmunjom meeting was never a realistic possibility from the outset.

◆ Why the 2019 Panmunjom Precedent No Longer Applies

President Trump and the Ministry of Unification would have had the June 2019 "Panmunjom encounter" in mind. At the time, the meeting among the leaders of the two Koreas and the United States materialized just 32 hours after President Trump proposed a DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) meeting with Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong Un via Twitter. For North Korea at that moment, there was a need to manage the fallout from the breakdown of the Hanoi U.S.–DPRK summit four months earlier. Despite the collapse at Hanoi, North Korea internally continued to assess its three meetings with President Trump highly.

In an article contributed to Kŭlloja (근로자), the theoretical journal of the Korean Workers' Party (Issue No. 9, 2023), Foreign Minister Ch'oe Sŏn-hui referred to the three leader-level meetings — the Singapore U.S.–DPRK summit of June 2018, the Hanoi summit of February 2019, and the June "Panmunjom summit encounter" — as "historic events worthy of special note in world diplomatic history" and "the greatest victory in the political and diplomatic struggle."

However, amid inter-Korean relations that have been entirely severed since the "antagonistic two-state" declaration of late 2023, the possibility of General Secretary Kim reappearing at Panmunjom — a "symbol of confrontation" — must be regarded as having vanished. Moreover, a summit in P'yŏngyang or Wŏnsan rather than Panmunjom would not have been a viable option in terms of either security arrangements or agenda.

◆ Words Versus Policy: Pyongyang's Calculation

North Korea has also signaled its intent not to come to dialogue on the strength of President Trump's "words" alone. Its position is that it will respond with a strategy commensurate with U.S. policy, not with the individual who happens to be U.S. President. And since inscribing its nuclear force policy into the revised constitution in September 2023, North Korea has made clear that "denuclearization" is not a condition for negotiation.

As an extension of this policy line, General Secretary Kim stated at the 13th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly on September 21: "Personally, I have good memories of the current U.S. President, Trump," adding, "If the United States were to discard its absurd obsession with denuclearization and genuinely desire peaceful coexistence with us, there is no reason we could not sit across from the United States." In effect, he presented recognition of nuclear possession as the baseline for the commencement of U.S.–DPRK dialogue.

President Trump has on multiple occasions referred to North Korea as a "nuclear power" and raised the prospect of "sanctions relief," yet the official positions of both the United States and South Korea continue to maintain the principle of "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." At the U.S.–Japan summit held on October 28, President Trump likewise agreed with Japan on cooperation toward "North Korea's denuclearization." When reports emerged that the North Korean denuclearization issue would be discussed as an agenda item at the ROK–China summit on November 1, North Korea pushed back through a statement by Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myŏng-ho, calling it "a pipe dream that can never be realized, however many hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of times you drone on about denuclearization."

Naturally, General Secretary Kim would have taken note of the gap between Trump's "words" and his actual "actions." President Trump's remarks themselves come closer to a military-sense acknowledgment that North Korea "possesses nuclear weapons," and remain some distance from the politically meaningful recognition as a "nuclear weapons state" that North Korea seeks.

◆ A Message Delivered Through Absence

On October 30, the day President Trump completed his Asia tour and returned home, General Secretary Kim inspected a hospital construction site in Kangdong County, P'yŏngyang. The message: too busy attending to the people's livelihood to meet this time, but let us look to the next occasion. It also constitutes pressure — a call for a grand bargain backed by concrete action, to be concluded in P'yŏngyang, rather than a performative meeting showcasing personal rapport.

One saving grace is that President Trump, as he departed for home, left the embers of U.S.–DPRK dialogue alight, saying he "would come back to meet Kim Jong Un." Thus far, the leaders of both South Korea and the United States have shown that they place greater weight on "dialogue" than on pressure such as sanctions as their approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

◆ Prospects: Timing, Venue, and Preconditions

The general expectation is that North Korea will decide on a meeting with Trump by weighing the political and diplomatic effects such dialogue would carry, the sincerity of U.S. statements regarding the withdrawal of denuclearization demands and the lifting of sanctions, and the prospects for progress in U.S.–DPRK relations. In terms of timing, because President Trump is scheduled to visit China next April, some anticipate the possibility of a U.S.–DPRK summit around that period with China serving as "mediator."

North Korea, however, is unlikely to favor holding a U.S.–DPRK meeting inside China through Chinese mediation. There is a strong possibility that North Korea would prefer a visit by President Trump to P'yŏngyang or Wŏnsan as the starting point for a process of normalizing U.S.–DPRK relations. This would require, as a precondition, a policy consensus within the United States and a process of ROK–U.S.–Japan consultation. Judging by North Korea's current policy line, a U.S.–DPRK meeting will not materialize naturally simply because President Trump happens to visit China.

◆ Inter-Korean Relations: Risk of Escalating Confrontation

The same applies to inter-Korean relations. During the APEC Summit period, President Lee Jae-myung signaled an intention to implement, within feasible limits, preemptive measures to restore trust between the two Koreas, and to support the establishment of a framework for U.S.–DPRK dialogue. At a press conference concluding the APEC Summit schedule on November 1, President Lee emphasized with regard to inter-Korean relations that "peace and stability become possible only when there is deterrence together with dialogue, compromise, persuasion, and the hope of coexistence and prosperity," adding that "the most secure form of national security is creating a peace in which there is no need to fight." He further affirmed that "recognizing the role of the United States and enabling President Trump to perform well as a peacemaker is the path to securing peace for the Republic of Korea," reiterating that "we will continue to work hard in the role of pacemaker."

However, with the South Korean side raising "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" as an agenda item at the ROK–China summit, and with the Ministry of Unification reaffirming that "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the unified goal of the international community," pushback from North Korea is to be expected. In response to the South Korean government invoking the twin pillars of "deterrence and dialogue," North Korea will place even greater emphasis on "self-defense capability and severance." This points to the risk that inter-Korean relations may hurtle toward military confrontation and diplomatic competition rather than exchange and dialogue.

In the immediate term, there is a strong likelihood that North Korea will announce countermeasures in response to South Korea's construction of a nuclear-powered submarine and the launch of its fifth reconnaissance satellite. Above all, because the Lee Jae-myung administration has itself relinquished the role of "peacemaker" and taken up the role of "pacemaker" for the United States, North Korea will concentrate solely on U.S.–DPRK dialogue rather than inter-Korean dialogue.

◆ On the Ground at the Border: Economic Cooperation Deepens

On October 27, during a return visit to Dandong after an interval of three months, the author observed a column of more than one hundred trucks entering North Korea via the China-Korea Friendship Bridge (Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge). They were reportedly loaded with construction materials required for the building of local city and rural housing under North Korea's "Local Development 20×10 Policy." China–DPRK trade volume this year is projected to increase by more than 30 percent over last year even by official statistics. North Korea's largest greenhouse farm, under construction on Wihwado, has also entered its final stage. As observed from the Tumen and Amnok Rivers, the center of gravity in China–DPRK and Russia–DPRK relations has been shifting from political and military cooperation toward substantive economic cooperation.

◆ Conclusion: No Guarantee for Next Year

President Trump has said he will return to meet General Secretary Kim. The South Korean government, placing considerable expectation in President Trump, has declared it will continue preemptive measures to improve inter-Korean relations. North Korea, too, has expressed a willingness to talk with the United States. Yet unless the calculus of U.S.–DPRK negotiations changes, there is no guarantee that the "Trump–Kim meeting" that fell through this time will take place next year.

North Korea is monitoring shifts in international politics and the Northeast Asian situation from a long-term perspective. Because of the experience of the Hanoi summit's collapse in 2019, it will not rush into a U.S.–DPRK meeting. The South Korean government, likewise, should not simply wait for U.S.–DPRK dialogue to resume, but must prepare a range of practical measures for how to respond to a "prolonged severance of inter-Korean relations."

About the Author

Jung Chang-hyun  |  Director, Peace Economy Research Institute

Historian and journalist. Graduated from the Department of Korean History, Seoul National University; completed doctoral coursework at the same institution. Currently Director of the Peace Economy Research Institute. Has pursued research, writing, and journalistic activities in the fields of inter-Korean relations and modern North Korean history for nearly 30 years.